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NOTE
HEARINGS PRIOR TO REVOCATION OF MENTAL
CONVALESCENT STATUS: A COMMENT ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, between 600,000 and 650,000 persons are hospitalized be-
cause of mental illness,' and approximately 500,000 new patients
are admitted annually.2 It has been projected that one out of every
twelve Americans will require treatment in a mental institution,3
and that a very large majority of these hospitalized patients will
be treated in public facilities.4 To the extent of providing treatment
for the mentally ill, the problem is one of medical technology and
public finance,5 issues essentially unrelated to law. The involun-
tary commitment of the mentally ill into mental health treatment
institutions, however, raises questions of prime concern to the legal
order.6
The state's substantive justification for involuntary commitment
can be reduced to two basic concepts. 7 First, the state may ex-
ercise its police power to protect society.8 Second, the state may
use its authority as parens patriae9 to protect an individual unable
1. R. R 0CK, M. JACOBSON, & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL].
2. Id.
3. Langdale, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REV. 255
(1968).
4. HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Comment, An Analysis of Admission and Release Procedures at the Yankton
State Hospital, 14 S.D.L. REv. 266, 267 (1968).
8. Id.
9. Parens patriae is defined as follows:
In the United States, the state, as a sovereign-referring to the sovereign
power of guardianship over persons under disability. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968).
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to protect himself.'1 The police power responds to the needs of the
community; parens patriae, on the other hand, is primarily con-
cerned with protecting the individual.1
For the purpose of this note, it is assumed that the foregoing
concepts constitute a valid basis of authority for confinement of the
mentally ill. It is also assumed that society has a sufficient interest
in the individual to protect him from himself or others from him.
It is conceded that such interest under the proper criteria and cir-
cumstances justifies involuntary commitment.1 2
This note is concerned with the framework of laws that control
the involuntary commitment and conditional release of the mentally
ill on convalescent status in North Dakota. More specifically, it fo-
cuses on the lack of procedural protections afforded the mentally
ill in North Dakota when conditional discharge is revoked.
,In light of the two assumptions enumerated above, the scope of
the inquiry is narrowed to the questionable constitutionality of Sec-
tion 25-03-16 of the North Dakota Century Code,' 3 which provides
that the superintendent of the state hospital shall have the authority
to grant a patient release on convalescent status, and then revoke
this discharge without notice, explanation, or procedural safeguards
of any kind.14
It is contended that the absence of procedural protections dur-
10. Comment, An Analysis of Admission and Release Procedures at the Yankton State
Hospital, 14 S.D.L. REV. 266, 267 (1968).
11. HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL, supra note 1 at 7.
12. The justifications for involuntary civil commitment have not gone uncontested,
and the problem has been recognized as the most serious deprivation of individual liberty
that a society may impose. Livermore, Malmquist, and Melhl, On the Justification for
Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968).
Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., has described involuntary commital as a form of imprison-
ment, and has stated: 'The practice of 'sane' men incarcerating their insane fellowmen
in mental hospitals can be compared to that of white men enslaving black men. In short,
I consider commitment a crime against humanity." T. Szasz, Science and Public Poicy:
The Crime of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization, MEDICAL. OPINION AND REVIEW 25
(1968).
13. N.D. CENT. COoE § 25-03-16 (1960) provides:
1. The superintendent of the state hospital may release a patient on con-
valescent status when he believes that such release is in the best interests
of the patient. Release on convalescent status shall include provisions for
continuing responsibility to and supervision by the hospital, and may in-
clude a plan of treatment on an out-patient or nonhospital patient basis.
Prior to the end of a year on convalescent status, and not less frequently
than annually thereafter, the superintendent of the state hospital shall re-
examine the facts relating to the hospitalization of the patient on conva-
lescent status and, if he determines in view of the condition of the patient
that hospitalization is no longer necessary, he shall discharge the patient
and make a report thereof to the state mental health and retardation divi-
sion and the mental health board of the county of residence.
2. Prior to such discharge, the superintendent of the state hospital may
at any time order the rehospitalization of the convalescent patient. Such an
order, if not voluntarily complied with, shall, upon the endorsement by a
Judge of the county court in which the patient is a resident or present, au-
thorize any health or police officer to take the patient into custody and
transport him to the state hospital. The costs of returning such patient
to the state hospital shall be paid by either the patient, his relatives le-
gally responsible for his support, or by the county, as the judge may direct.
14. Id.
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ing this revocation process violates the patient's right to due process
of law. Since North Dakota provides that a person whose parole
has been revoked shall have access to a "full hearing,"' 15 it is also
contended that the distinction thus created between parolees and
patients on convalescent status discharge, in relation to the guar-
antees of due process, is a violation of the patient's right to equal
protection of the law.
II. CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE
Conditional discharge on mental convalescent status is a situa-
tion in which the improved patient is allowed to leave the hospi-
tal, 6 although his continued release depends on his compliance with
certain conditions. 1 7 The patient's failure to adjust to his new en-
vironment or to comply with any of the conditions attached to his
release may result in his being returned to the hospital."' Condition-
al discharge may provide a period of transition for the improved
patient, 9 or serve as a device for providing care for patients not
requiring hospital facilities. 20
One authority has described the procedure of conditional re-
lease as:
[A] means of finishing off the rehabilitative processes be-
gun under medical supervision in the hospital. From the
point of . . . re-establishment of the individual in society,
it is the only logical means of safely bridging over the gap
between hospital care and self-directed life in the commu-
nity. From the point of view of the hospital management,
it does serve to reduce population and thus it diminishes the
public expense for the maintenance of the insane.
[M]any patients can be discharged under supervision and
15. N D. CENT. CODE § 12-59-15 (1971 SUpP.) provides:
Any person shall be deemed to be in the custody and under the con-
trol of the board while on parole, and shall be subject, at any time until
the expiration of the term for which he was sentenced, to be taken into
actual custody and returned to the penitentiary. The board shall enforce
the rules and regulations made by it for the paroling of persons committed
to the penitentiary. When it shall appear to the board after a full hearing
(emphasis added) that a person out on parole has violated any of such rules
or regulations, it may order that such person be taken into actual custody
and recommitted to and confined in the penitentiary as provided in his sen-
tence. The board shall enter any such order in the record of the proceed-
ings. A copy of the order certified by the clerk of the board may be de-
livered to any sheriff or other peace officer of the state for service and
return, and it shall be the duty of any such officer to receive the same, to
apprehend and immediately to return any person named in the order and
to deliver him to the warden of the penitentiary. The warden shall receive
and re-imprison such person in accordance with the terms of his original
sentence.
16. S. BRAKEL & R. RoCK, THE MENTALLY DIsABLED AND THE LAW 134 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw.]
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 135.
20. Id.
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become self-supporting under these conditions when it
would be unsafe to discharge them absolutely from hospital
supervision.21
Although he lives outside the institution, a conditionally released
patient is considered to be in the constructive custody of the hos-
pital and under the original commitment papers; 22 further legal
proceedings are not needed to return the patient to the hospital. 2
From the patient's point of view, the problem is obvious: he may
suddenly find himself removed from his home, family, friends, and
employment, and returned to the state hospital without notice or
explanation.
Since a conditionally released patient may be returned to the
state hospital at any time, he is under a constant threat of loss
of liberty. The question for discussion, therefore, is whether a ter-
mination of this conditional liberty without an evidentiary hearing
prior to termination denies the patient procedural due process in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
III. DUE PROCESS
Perhaps the most frequent basis for denying procedural due
process in situations involving revocation of conditional liberty has
been the notion that conditional liberty is a privilege, 24 the result
of an act of grace, 25 and thus a person cannot complain when his
conditional liberty is revoked without the benefit of procedural
safeguards. 26
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court in Escoe v. Zerbst,27
reasoned that since probation was instituted for federal prisoners by
the Federal Probation Act, it was not a "right," but a "privilege"
granted by Congress.28 The Court, therefore, found that Congress
could dispense with notice or hearing as part of the procedure of
probation. 29
The United States Supreme Court no longer relies solely on the
legislative characterization of a governmental benefit as a "right"
or "privilege" to determine whether this benefit is constitutionally
21. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 134, quoting Haines,
Lessons from the Principles Governing the Parole Procedures in Hospitals for the Insane,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 159, 160 (1920).
22. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 134.
23. Id.
24,. Comment, Parole Revocation Hearings-Pro Justica or Pro Camera Stellata, 10
SANTA CLARA LAw. 319, 331-32 (1969-70).
25. Id. at 332.
26. Id.
27. Esco v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
28. Id. at 492.
29. Id. at 492-93.
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required.3 1
'[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may re-
quire under any given set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by government action.'3 '
Procedural protections depend on the extent to which an indi-
vidual will be condemned to suffer "grievous loss, ' 3 2 and on wheth-
er the individual's interests in avoiding that loss outweighs the gov-
ernmental interest in summary adjudication.3 3 The question is not
merely the weight of the individual's interest, but whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the "lib-
erty" or "property" language of the fourteenth amendment.3
A recent case dealing with the issue of termination of condi-
tional liberty is Morrissey v. Brewer,35 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a parolee's liberty involves significant
values within the protection of the due process clause, and termi-
nation of that liberty requires an informal hearing to assure that
the finding of a parole violation is based on verified facts to sup-
port the revocation.
The Court first examined the nature of the parolee's interest in
continued liberty, and found that his liberty enables him to do
many things that persons who have never been convicted of a crime
30. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 (1969) ; Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970). In Hahn, a case involving
probation, the court was mindful that probation was a privilege and not a right, but
stated that procedural due process no longer turns on the distinction between right and
privilege. Id. at 103.
The court weighed the extent to which the petitioner would be condemned to suffer
"grievous loss" against the governmental interest, and found the loss of freedom to out-
weigh the added burden of a limited hearing. Id. at 104.
The court reasoned that when the state created probation it implIedly agreed in
continue petitioner's probation as long as the conditions were satisfied. To allow the
state to revoke probation without a hearing to determine if the conditions had been
violated would be inconsistent with the due process guarantees of the fourteenth amnend-
ment. Id.
31. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
32. Goldberg v .Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), quoting Joint A-nti-Facist Refuge
Comm. v. McGrath, 314 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
33. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that
termination of public assistance without affording the recipient an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due process. The
decision was reached by a two step process in which the Court determined that the re-
cipient would be condemned to suffer grievous loss by the termination and that the
recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighed the governmental interest in sum-
mary adjudication. Id. at 262.
The loss was found to be 'grievous" since termination of welfare benefits would
deprive the recipient of the very means by which to live. Id. at 264.
Thus, it was held that the interest of the recipient in uninterrupted receipt of
public assistance clearly outweighed the state's interest in preventing any increase In Its
fiscal and administrative burdens. Id. at 266.
34. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
35. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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may do.38 The Court noted that subject to the conditions of parole,
the parolee can hold a job, and can enjoy a normal relationship
with his family and friends.3 7
From this examination of the characteristic features of the
parolee's liberty, the Court concluded:
We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unquali-
fied liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous loss" on
the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful any
longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether
the parolee's liberty is a right or a privilege. By whatever
name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termina-
tion calls for some orderly process, however informal. 38
While the Court was mindful that the state has an interest in
being able to return the parolee to imprisonment without the bur-
den of a criminal trial, 9 nevertheless, it ruled that the state may
not revoke parole without providing minimal procedural safeguards. 40
Nor was the Court persuaded by the argument that revocation is a
discretionary matter on the part of the parole board and will be-
come an intolerable administrative burden if a hearing is requir-
ed. 41 The Court stated that a simple hearing will not interfere with
the administrative exercise of discretion.4 2 The Court noted that
society has an interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness,
since fair treatment in parole revocation will improve the chance of
rehabilitation. 43
The Court recognized two stages in the process of parole re-
vocation: first, when the parolee is arrested, and second, when pa-
role is formally revoked. 44 With regard to the first stage, the Court
stated:
Given these factors, due process would seem to require that
some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near
the place of the alleged violation or arrest, and as prompt-
ly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and
sources are available. . . Such an inquiry should be seen
as in the nature of a preliminary hearing to determine
whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to be-
36. Id. at 482.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 483.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id at 484.
44. Id.
NOTE
lieve that the arrested parolee has committed acts that
would constitute a violation of parole conditions. 45
With regard to the second stage, the Court concluded that aside
from the "preliminary hearing," due process requires a "final hear-
ing," 46 the purpose of which is to evaluate the relevant facts and
to determine if these facts support a conclusion that revocation of
parole status is warranted.47
Thus, it is clear that a person on parole is entitled to certain
procedural protection afforded by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. His liberty is closely related to unqualified
liberty, a revocation of that liberty inflicts a "grievous loss" on the
parolee, and a two stage hearing procedure is necessary to ensure
fairness in the revocation process . 4 Without the benefit of a hear-
ing, there is no assurance that the findings of the parole board will
be based on verified facts. These facts should, in all fairness, be
substantiated before the parolee can be deprived of his liberty.
Mental convalescent status discharge, like parole, involves con-
ditional release from institutional confinement,4 9 and like the pa-
rolee, the patient on mental convalescent status discharge is al-
lowed to return to his home, family, friends, and employment.
5 0 It
can be argued that revocation of mental convalescent status dis-
charge is similar to revocation of parole status in that both result
in a "grievous loss" to the individual affected. From the reasoning
of the Court in Morrissey, it follows that the mental patient on con-
ditional release is entitled to the procedural protections of due pro-
cess.
Since the private interest affected by the governmental action
when mental convalescent status discharge is revoked is similar
to the private interest affected when parole is revoked, the proce-
dural protections granted the parolee should also be granted the
patient on mental convalescent discharge. Therefore, to meet the
requirements set forth in Morrissey, due process requires a preli-
minary field hearing to determine if probable cause exists to be-
lieve that the patient did violate the conditions under which he was
conditionally released,5 1 and a final hearing at the state hospital
to determine if the violations are substantial enough to warrant re-
vocation of convalescent status discharge. 52
45. Id.
4.6. Id. at 487.
47. Id. at 488.
48. Id.
49. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 134.
50. Id.
51. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
52. Id. at 488.
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From the above discussion, it is clear that the North Dakota
statute that gives the superintendent of the state hospital unrestrict-
ed power to revoke convalescent status5" does not meet the require-
ments set forth in Morrissey. Therefore, it is contended that the
statute is in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Although the equal protection clause has been interpreted as a
limitation on legislative classifications, this does not mean that a
state cannot create any classification. 54 The equal protection clause
does not prevent the legislature from recognizing "degrees of evil," 55
nor does it preclude the legislature from conforming its restric-
tions to those classes of cases where the need is thought to be the
greatest.5 6 The United States Supreme Court has held that things
different in fact need not be treated the same in law,5 7 but persons
similarily situated must be treated alike.58
The Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered test in cases in-
volving equal protection. In most instances, classifications are up-
held unless they are without a rational basis.59 In other cases, how-
ever, where the classification is grounded on "suspect" criteria,
60
or where the classification impinges on certain "fundamental
rights,"'6 1 strict judicial scrutiny is required, and the classification
will stand only if justified by a compelling governmental interest.6 2
The Supreme Court has not classified conditional liberty as a
fundamental right, nor is there any case law to support the con-
tention that classifying mental patients on the basis of their con-
valescent status is a suspect criteria. Therefore, for the purpose of
this note, it is assumed that the rational basis test is the standard
of review to apply.
The Supreme Court's definition of what constitutes the neces-
sary rational relationship between a classification and a legitimate
governmental interest has been interpreted as having become more
strict in recent years.63 In McGowan v. Maryland," for example,
the Supreme Court held that a classification is to be sustained un-
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-I6 (1960).
54. Bain Peanut Butter Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1930).
55. Trux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915).
56. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384. (1914).
57. Tign v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1939).
58. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, .540 (1941).
59. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
60. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
61. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
62. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
63. Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629. 633 (2nd Cir. 1973).
64. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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less "wholly irrelevant" to some permissible state purpose.6 5 How-
ever, in a much more recent Supreme Court decision, Reed v. Reed,66
the Court stated:
A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of legislation. .7
Reed provides evidence that the Court is prepared to be more
discerning when using the traditional rational basis standard in
cases involving questions of equal protection . 6 In Reed, the Court
struck down a section of the Idaho probate code which gave man-
datory preference to men over women when competing for the right
to administer a decedent's estate.6 9 Chief Justice Burger, writing
for a unanimous Court, never reached the question of whether sex
was a suspect classification. Rather, he declared that no rational
relationship existed between the Staate's methods and its objectives.7 0
Although the Court's future direction on questions of equal protec-
tion is uncertain, the intensified rationality test employed by the
Court in Reed7 1 warrants close attention, and should be kept in
mind during the following equal protection discussion.
Although the parolee is deemed worthy of protection under the
due process clause, he is not afforded the safeguards inherent in
the criminal process. In Hyser v. Reed 7 2 the court concluded that
parole revocation was neither a criminal prosecution nor an ad-
versary proceeding.7 3 The court reasoned that the nature of parole
is rehabilitative, and as such, due process does not require cross-
examination of the board's sources.7 4 The court stated that parole
could not be revoked arbitrarily, 75but to hold that complusory pro-
cess is constitutionally required would imply that revocation hear-
ings are comparable to criminal prosecutions rather than admini-
strative processes. 7 6
Much the same rational was applied in Alverez v. Turner,7
where the court concluded that parole revokees are not entitled to
the specifics of due process, 781 but are entitled to due process as
that mandate reflects the right to all persons to be treated fairly
65. Id.
66. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
67. Id.
68. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 33 (1972).
69. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
70. Id. a t 76-77 (1971).
71. See also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
72. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id. at 240.
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in complusory processes. 79 The court reasoned that the board's
familiarity with the prisoner's case history distinguishes it from the
courtroom setting, and is the reason why traditional rules of evi-
dence, including discovery, have no application to these proceed-
ings.S0
And in Morrissey v. Brewer,8' the Court stated:
Revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution,
and thus, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. Parole
arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including
imposition of sentence. Supervision is not directly by the
court but by an administrative agency, which is sometimes
an arm of the court, and sometimes of an executive. Re-
vocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional
liberty properly dependent on observation of special parole
restrictions .82
The purpose of parole is to help prisoners reenter society, with-
out being confined for the full duration of their sentence. 3 Parole
alleviates the cost to society of keeping an individual in prison, and
is an important part of the rehabilitative aim of the correctional
philosophy.8 4
Patients on convalescent status discharge are in a class similar
to parolees. The purpose of convalescent status discharge is to pro-
vide the patient with the opportunity of making an orderly re-ad-
justment from an institutional to a non-institutional environment. 5
Conditional discharge of mental patients, like parole, pursues the
goals of rehabilitation, surveillance, and economy. 6 Conditions are
attached to the grant. Furthermore, the community serves as the
correctional milieu, and the patient is under the supervision of some-
one who has access to coercive authority.
One argument that the state will undoubtedly present to justify
retaining the distinction between the parolee and the mental con-
valescent with regard to the right to a set of hearings before re-
vocation of conditional liberty, is that the parolee was originally in-
carcerated under criminal sanctions, and that this reason is a ra-
77. Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970).
78. Id. at 220.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 218.
81. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
82. Id. at 480.
83. Id. at 477.
84. Id.
85. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 134,136.
86. Id.
87. Id.
tional basis for denying patients on mental convalescent status the
same procedural safeguards as the parolee.
In Baxtrom v. Herold,88 however, the Supreme Court held that
a New York statutory procedure, whereby a prisoner civilly com-
mitted to a mental institution at the expiration of his sentence with-
out the jury review available to all other civilly committed persons,
was a denial of equal protection of the laws.8 9 The basis for the
decision was that prior incarceration is an insufficient and irrational
basis for discriminating between otherwise similarily situated indi-
viduals: who face loss of liberty.90
A second, and perhaps stronger argument that the state could
make derives its basis from the treatment aspects of mental health
commitments. An individual will be committed to the North Dakota
State Hospital if the mental health board finds that the proposed
patient:
a. Is mentally ill, an alcoholic or a drug addict, and be-
cause of his illness is likely to injure himself or others
if allowed to remain at liberty; or
b. Is in need of custody, care, or treatment in a mental
hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient in-
sight or capacity to make responsible decisions with re-
spect to his hospitalization.9
Should an individual be committed, release on convalescent status
is appropriate when the patient has progressed to the point where
he can be treated outside the institution.2 Even though the patient
may not be receiving any prescribed medication during the condi-
tional release, his readjustment from an institution to a non-institu-
tional environment may be considered a part of the treatment pro-
gram.93
The conditional release provides the hospital with a means by
which it can expedite the return of the patient for treatment should
the conditions which justified the original hospitalization reappear.
Thus, the state may raise the argument that a hearing before re-
vocation of mental convalescent status discharge will cause unneces-
sary delay; delay that could result in the patient not receiving the
necessary care and treatment.
This is a valid argument, but not one that serves as a rational
basis for denying patients the right to a hearing before revocation
88. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
89. Id. at 110.
90. Id. at 111-112.
91. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11 (1971 Supp.)
92. THE: MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 134-135.
93. Id.
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of conditional discharge. In emergency situations, the preliminary
field hearing that is necessary to meet the requirements of due pro-
cess can be waived,9" and the patient returned to the state hos-
pital for treatment. Once the necessary treatment has been adminis-
tered, the final hearing should be held to determine if the facts
warrant revocation of the mental convalescent discharge. The emer-
gency situation should be the exception rather than the rule, how-
ever, and in the majority of cases, the preliminary hearing should
be convened before the patient is transported to the state hospital.
In light of the emphasis on rehabilitation, and on the use of the
community rather than the institution as the means for achieving
that goal, there is no legitimate ground for continuing to distinguish
between these types of conditional releases, where the only difference
is that the parolee has been in prison, and the patient on con-
valescent status leave has been in a mental hospital. Both are in
a class with whom society has taken risks by extending restricted
liberty in an effort to rehabilitate them. Should the experiment in
rehabilitation fail, both will be returned to institutional confinement,
confinement that inflicts a "grievous loss" on each. Therefore, both
are of one and the same class, and by applying the stricter rational
basis standard set forth in Reed, it can be argued that the state
has no rational basis for distinguishing between the two. Hence, the
denial to patients on convalescent status discharge of the enumer-
ated procedural safeguards afforded parolees in arguably a viola-
tion of the equal protection of the laws.
In addition to the assertion that Section 25-03-16 of the North
Dakota Century Code is a violation of due process, it is contended
that this statute which gives complete control over revocation of
convalescent status to the superintendent of the state hospital is a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
V. THE HEARINGS
Based on the requirements set forth in Morrissey, the prelimi-
nary hearing should be presided over by someone other than the
individual who alleges that convalescent status discharge conditions
have been violated. The hearing officer should be someone in the
community who can make an independent decision as to whether
probable cause exists to believe that the patient did violate the con-
ditions under which he was discharged.
94. The authority to waive the preliminary hearing should be delegated to someone
in the community who is qualified to make a determination of need for immediate treat-
ment. A physician would he the most likely person to make such a decision. It should be
pointed out, however, that to ensure a truly objective diagnosis, the doctor should not
be associated in any way with the mental institution to which the patient is returning.
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NOTE
With respect to the preliminary hearing, the patient should be
given notice that the hearing will take place, the purpose of the
hearing, and an opportunity to question those who have given ad-
verse information on which revocation is to be based.95 From the
information gathered at the hearing, the hearing officer should de-
termine whether probable cause exists to return the patient to the
state hospital until the final hearing.96
The minimum requirements for the final hearing should include
(a) written notice of the claimed violations; (b) disclosure to the
patient of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in per-
son and to present witnesses and evidence; (d) the right to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (e) a hearing body
made up of individuals qualified to make a determination of need
for re-hospitalization; and (f) a written statement by the fact find-
ers as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revocation of the
convalescent status discharge.9 7
VI. CONCLUSION
In Morrissey v. Brewer,9 8 the United States Supreme Court ex-
tended many aspects of due process to parole revocation procedures.
This note has examined the reasoning of Morrissey and the simi-
larities between parole and mental convalescent status discharge.
From this examination, it is apparent that the analogy drawn be-
tween parole revocation and mental convalescent status discharge
revocation is a legitimate one, and that the specifics of due process
granted the parolee should also be afforded the patient on conval-
escent leave.
In North Dakota, the patient on mental convalescent status dis-
charge is subject to the caprice of the superintendent of the state
hospital who may, for any reason, order the immediate return of
the patient to the hospital. 9 Before court action ultimately resolves
the issue, it is recommended that the North Dakota statute be
amended to provide due process for those persons who have been
released from mental health institutions on convalescent status.
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